

4 JUL 1971

# KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM STUDY

*Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the period in early 1968 surrounding the Vietcong's Tet offensive. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.*

## Adm. Sharp's Progress Report On War at End of 1967

Excerpts from cablegram from Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief of Pacific forces, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated Jan. 1, 1968, and headed "Year-End Wrap-Up Cable," as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. Paragraphs in italics are the study's paraphrase or explanation.

Admiral Sharp outlined three objectives which the air campaign was seeking to achieve: disruption of the flow of external assistance into North Vietnam, curtailment of the flow of supplies from North Vietnam into Laos and South Vietnam, and destruction "in depth" of North Vietnamese resources that contributed to the support of the war. Acknowledging that the flow of fraternal communist aid into the North had grown every year of the war, CINCPAC noted the stepped up effort in 1967 to neutralize this assistance by logistically isolating its primary port of entry—Haiphong. The net results, he felt, had been encouraging:

The overall effect of our effort to reduce external assistance has resulted not only in destruction and damage to the transportation systems and goods being transported thereon but has created additional management, distribution and manpower problems. In addition, the attacks have created a bottleneck at Haiphong where inability effectively to move goods inland from the port has resulted in congestion on the docks and a slowdown in offloading ships as they arrive. By October, road and rail interdictions had reduced the transportation clearance capacity at Haiphong to about 2700 short tons per day. An average of 4400 short tons per day had arrived in Haiphong during the year.

The assault against the continuing traffic of men and material through North Vietnam toward Laos and South Vietnam, however, had produced only marginal results. Success here was measured in the totals of destroyed transport, not the constriction of the flow of personnel and goods.

Although men and material needed for the level of combat now prevailing in South Vietnam continue to flow de-

spite our attacks on LOCs, we have made it very costly to the enemy in terms of material, manpower, management, and distribution. From 1 January through 15 December 1967, 122,960 attack sorties were flown in Rolling Thunder route packages I through V and in Laos, SEA Dragon offensive operations involved 1,384 ship-days on station and contributed materially in reducing enemy seaborne infiltration in southern NVN and in the vicinity of the DMZ. Attacks against the NVN transport system during the past 12 months resulted in destruction of carriers, cargo carried, and personnel casualties. Air attacks throughout North Vietnam and Laos destroyed or damaged 5,261 motor vehicles, 2,475 railroad rolling stock, and 11,425 watercraft from 1 January through 20 December 1967. SEA DRAGON accounted for another 1,473 WBLC destroyed or damaged from 1 January - 30 November. There were destroyed rail-lines, bridges, ferries, railroad yards and shops, storage areas, and truck parks. Some 3,685 land targets were struck by Sea Dragon forces, including the destruction or damage of 303 coastal defense and radar sites. Through external assistance, the enemy has been able to replace or rehabilitate many of the items damaged or destroyed, and transport inventories are roughly at the same level they were at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless, construction problems have caused interruptions in the flow of men and supplies, caused a great loss of work-hours, and restricted movement particularly during daylight hours.

The admission that transport inventories were the same at year's end as when it began must have been a painful one indeed for CINCPAC in view of the campaign against the transport system in many

aircraft, and lives. As a consolation for this signal failure, CINCPAC pointed to the extensive diversion of civilian manpower to war related activities as a result of the bombing.

A primary effect of our efforts to impede movement of the enemy has been to force Hanoi to engage from 500,000 to 600,000 civilians in full-time and part-time war-related activities, in particular for air defense and repair of the LOCs. This diversion of manpower from other pursuits, particularly from the agricultural sector, has caused a drawdown on manpower. The estimated lower food production yields, coupled with an increase in food imports in 1967 (some six times that of 1966), indicate that agriculture is having great difficulty in adjusting to this changed composition of the work force. The cost and difficulties of the war to Hanoi have sharply increased, and only through the willingness of other communist countries to provide maximum replacement of goods and material has NVN managed to sustain its war effort.

To these manpower diversions CINCPAC added the cost to North Vietnam in 1967 of the destruction of vital resources—the third of his air war objectives:

### C. Destroying vital resources:

Air attacks were authorized and executed by target systems for the first time in 1967, although the attacks were limited to specific targets within each system. A total of 9,740 sorties was flown against targets on the ROLLING THUNDER target list from 1 January - 15 December 1967. The campaign against the power system resulted in reduction of power generating capability to approximately 15 percent of original capacity. Successful strikes against the Thau Nguyen iron and steel plant and the Haiphong cement plant resulted in practically total destruction of these two installations. NVN adjustments to these losses have had to be made by relying on additional imports from China, the USSR or the Eastern European countries. The requirement for additional imports reduces available shipping space for war-supporting supplies and adds to the congestion at the ports. Interruptions in raw material supplies and the requirement to turn to less efficient means of power and distribu-

3  
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00  
 PHILADELPHIA, PA.  
 INQUIRER

M - 463,503  
 S - 867,810

JUL 4 1971

## *Letters to the Editor*

# 'Blunders' Were McNamara's

To the Editor:

Your editorial entitled, "Pentagon Blunders in Vietnam Cry Out for Defense Overhaul" was predictable. You have arrived at the conclusion which the so-called Pentagon historians sought in producing the mammoth 47-volume "history" of the U. S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

During his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara ruled the Pentagon with a rod of iron. No one group was able to win him over to their point of view—it was the other way around.

May I call your attention to an authoritative study of the management of our defense establishment under Secretary McNamara, "How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969" by Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. Enthoven was assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis during much of McNamara's tenure, and Smith was Enthoven's special assistant. They state that McNamara had an "active management" conception of his role according to which "the principal task of the secretary of defense is personally to grasp the strategic issues and provide active leadership to develop a defense program that sensibly relates all factors" including foreign policy, military strategy, defense budgets, and the choice of major weapons and forces.

As in all other phases of defense planning, McNamara participated fully in the planning of the Vietnam war. He ordered the phasing of the intervention as well as the bombing. The bombing policy which he imposed carried within it the seeds of failure. Mr. McCone, the civilian director of the CIA, pointed out at the time that Hanoi would be able to see through the symbolic nature of such bombing as was initially conducted under the gradual escalation policies ordered by Mr. McNamara.

Only after the initial phase of the bombing campaign had failed did some of the military leaders argue, unsuccessfully, that the policy be changed. But for the sake of Mr. McNamara's reputation and those anti-Johnson elements within the Democratic Party, the blame had to be shifted from civilian to military leaders.

If military leaders are to be charged with incompetence, the credibility of their civilian masters in the Department of Defense should be equally subjected to questioning, especially in light of the revealing study by Enthoven and Smith about the McNamara management of the Pentagon, supposedly the most efficiently run department under the leadership of one of the greatest organizational geniuses of this century.

WILLIAM R. KINTNER  
 Director, Foreign Policy  
 Research Institute

Philadelphia.